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Don’t Tread on Me: The Need for an 
Alternate Dispute Resolution Process 
for the Creators and Uploaders of 
User-Generated Content 
Scott A. Tarbell1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
There is little doubt that this millennium has witnessed the technological 
advent of new forms of communication that facilitate the exchange and 
sharing of ideas.  Among this trend has been the introduction of what can be 
termed User Generated Content (UGC) sites created by online service 
providers (OSPs), where users can upload and display their works for public 
consumption.  Although some websites already existed to allow users to 
share their works and witness the creations of others, it was not until around 
2005 that UGC sharing was adopted for serious mainstream use in any 
meaningful capacity.2  An important pioneer in this transformation was 
YouTube.  Founded in 2005,3 this OSP rapidly grew into a multi-billion 
dollar industry and was purchased by Google in 2006 for $1.65 billion.4  
Giving people free access to a place where they could upload and share their 
 
 1. J.D. Candidate 2014, Pepperdine University School of Law. 
 2. See YouTube Hits 100m Videos Per Day, BBC NEWS (Jul. 17, 2006, 10:59 AM), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/5186618.stm; Rob Hof, YouTube: 100 Million Videos a Day, 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Jul. 14, 2006), 
http://www.businessweek.com/the_thread/techbeat/archives/2006/07/youtube_100_mil.html.  While 
blogs and review sites certainly existed prior to 2005 and were gaining in popularity, they were 
quickly overshadowed by YouTube’s explosive success, which only a year after its inception was 
already uploading approximately 100 million videos a day.  See YouTube Hits 100m Videos Per 
DayDocument1: Hof. 
 3. About YouTube, YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/t/about_youtube (last visited Sept. 
21, 2013). 
 4. See generally Associated Press, Google buys YouTube for $1.65 Billion, MSNBC (Oct. 10, 
2006, 10:47 AM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/15196982/ns/business-us_business/t/google-buys-
youtube-billion/#.UJQo08XA-Jo; Google Buys YouTube for $1.65bn, BBC NEWS (Oct. 10, 2006, 
4:03 AM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/6034577.stm. 
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thoughts and ideas to anyone with an online connection proved to be one of 
the most lucrative ventures for an Internet that had just stepped out of its 
nascency. 
However, along with the newfound ability to submit UGC onto 
YouTube’s servers came the inevitable problem of copyright infringement—
at some point it became obvious that not all videos uploaded or even all 
parts of certain videos were going to be free from claims of infringement by 
copyright holders.  Although YouTube alerted users that they must own the 
rights to the material or have the necessary permission for anything 
submitted to YouTube’s servers5, users continued to upload copyrighted 
material anyway.  Initially, YouTube did not provide any real analysis of 
videos uploaded,6 instead opting to wait for copyright holders to submit 
takedown notices pursuant to statutory provisions listed under the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA).  The precarious situation YouTube 
found itself in could not continue as the status quo forever, and before long 
groups and individuals began to file lawsuits against YouTube claiming that 
the OSP was responsible for the copyright infringement of its users.7 
One such group was Viacom International.8  A few months after the 
conglomerate initiated a suit against YouTube in 2007 alleging failure on the 
OSP’s part in maintaining proper vigilance in combating copyright 
infringement,9 YouTube in turn introduced its Content ID program10 in an 
attempt to ameliorate its ability to detect infringement and mollify 
excoriating claims that the OSP was profiting off of pirated material.11  For 
Content ID to work, copyright holders deliver to YouTube a variety of their 
content reference files and any necessary metadata (descriptive information 
about the data itself) and state what they would like YouTube to do should 
 
 5. Upload Video Files, YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/my_videos_upload (last visited 
Sept. 21, 2013).  At the upload screen, YouTube warns users that they “must own the copyright or 
have the necessary rights for any content” they upload.  Id. 
 6. See infra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.  YouTube’s Content ID program, which 
checked the content uploaded by users on its own without requiring a prior copyright holder 
takedown notice, did not exist until 2007.  See infra notes 9-11 and accompanying text. 
 7. See, e.g., Tur v. YouTube, Inc., 562 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2009); Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. 
YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); see also Eugene C. Kim, YouTube: Testing 
the Safe Harbors of Digital Copyright Law, 17 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 139, 143–44 (2007). 
 8. See supra note 7. 
 9. See Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 28, 28 n.5 (2d Cir. 2012).  The 
charges by Viacom alleged direct and secondary copyright infringement, the latter of which included 
“contributory, vicarious, and inducement liability.”  Id. 
 10. Kevin J. Delaney, YouTube to Test Software to Ease Licensing Fights, WALL ST. J. (Jun. 
12, 2007), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB118161295626932114.html. 
 11. See Cory Doctorow, The Pirates of YouTube, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 12, 2011, 10:27 AM), 
www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2011/dec/12/pirates-of-youtube-cory-doctorow (“Running Content 
ID isn’t a legal duty, it’s an olive branch extended by YouTube to the audiovisual industries.”). 
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Content ID locate a match.12  Options available for copyright holders are: (1) 
monetize, (2) track, or (3) block.13  “Monetize” will institute ads around the 
video playing itself, or ads that play prior to the video requested; “track” has 
YouTube record the viewing metrics of the video; and, lastly, “block” 
culminates in an automated takedown of the video.14 
YouTube has a three-strike policy,15 with each strike attached to an 
account whenever infringing material is taken down.  Should a user account 
garner three strikes in which either: (1) YouTube’s own Content ID 
registered a match between uploaded material and protected content or (2) 
YouTube removed uploaded material via a copyright holder’s takedown 
notice, the user account will be taken offline along with any other uploaded 
materials still attached to the account.16  A notice is sent to alert the user 
each time alleged infringing content is taken down.17 
To fully appreciate the consequences of this policy, it is necessary that 
the details are addressed more closely.  This article analyzes the current 
position that UGC site users find themselves in relation to their ability to 
dispute copyright infringement claims.  Part II discusses the introduction and 
purpose of the DMCA along with the statutory provisions and case law 
relevant to the subject. Part III covers the underlying issues encumbering the 
current appeals process for the OSPs as dictated under the DMCA, and why 
changes are required.  Part IV advocates for a new dispute process, one in 
favor of online alternative dispute resolution (ODR), and explains how this 
new paradigm would produce more equitable results for UGC site users.  
Finally, Part V lists further changes that would be necessary in order to 
ensure that ODR exists as (and continues in the future to be) a more viable, 
 
 12. See A Guide to YouTube Removals, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., 
https://www.eff.org/issues/intellectual-property/guide-to-youtube-removals (last visited Sept. 21, 
2013); Content ID, YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/t/contentid (last visited Sept. 21, 2013). 
 13. See supra note 12. 
 14. See supra note 12. 
 15. See A Guide to YouTube Removals, supra note 12 (“The takedown notice will also count 
as a “strike” on your account – after three strikes, YouTube will cancel all of your YouTube 
accounts and remove all of your videos.”). 
 16. Copyright Strike Basics, YOUTUBE, 
http://support.google.com/youtube/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=2814000 (last visited Sept. 21, 
2013). 
 17. See A Guide to YouTube Removals, supra note 12 (“The reason for the removal of a video 
is usually mentioned in the email that YouTube sends to the account holder regarding the removal. . . 
. The message also should appear in your YouTube mailbox, so check there as well.”). 
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equitable, and less expensive process for resolving YouTube-like OSP 
copyright infringement disputes than the current system presently allows. 
II. THE CREATION OF THE DMCA AND ITS PROVISIONS 
 Congress enacted the DMCA in 1998 in order to modernize existing 
copyright law, assist copyright holders in taking down infringing material, 
and provide OSPs with statutory safe harbor provisions.18  The safe harbor 
provisions were enacted to assist OSPs, which had been long-suffering from 
years of copyright infringement claims brought by copyright holders, in 
obtaining legal immunity so long as they complied with the mandates 
within.19  Located under section 512 of the Copyright Act, four subsections 
cover four different categories of OSPs and list the respective requirements 
that OSPs in each category must meet to obtain and maintain safe harbor 
immunity from copyright infringement claims.20 
Under the DMCA, an OSP is defined as “a provider of online services 
or network access, or the operator of facilities therefor,”21 which includes 
entities “offering the transmission, routing, or providing of connections for 
digital online communications .†.†. of the user’s choosing, without 
modification to the content of the material as sent or received.”22  The safe 
harbor provision will only apply to an OSP if it: 
(A) has adopted and reasonably implemented, and informs subscribers and account 
holders of the service provider’s system or network of, a policy that provides for the 
termination in appropriate circumstances of subscribers and account holders of the 
 
 18. See H.R. REP. NO. 105–551, pt. 2, at 20, 21 (1998).  The DMCA was designed to 
implement the treaties signed by the United States and other countries at the World Intellectual 
Property Organization (WIPO), which “would have amended Title 17 of the United States Code to 
grant copyright owners a new right against ‘circumvention’ of ‘technological protection measures,’ 
and to establish new provisions dealing with the integrity of ‘copyright management information.’”  
Id. at 20.  The House bill to implement the DMCA, H.R. 2281, included two titles to be 
implemented: “Title I would implement the WIPO treaties; and Title II would provide for limitations 
on copyright infringement liability for on-line and other service providers.”  Id. at 21. 
 19. See Niva Elkin-Koren, Making Technology Visible: Liability of Internet Service Providers 
for Peer-to-Peer Traffic, 9 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 15, 29 (2006) (citing Working Group on 
Intellectual Property Rights, Information Infrastructure Task Force, Intellectual Property and the 
National Information Infrastructure 114–24 (1995)).  The DMCA as a whole was drafted based on 
the recommendations of the Clinton Administration’s Working Group on Intellectual Property 
Rights (Working Group), which stressed that while OSPs were in the unique situation of best 
knowing the activities of their subscribers and how to stop illicit activities, there nevertheless was 
“the need to reduce liability in special circumstances given the diversity of services offered” by 
OSPs.  Id. 
 20. 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)–(d) (2010). 
 21. Id.§ 512(k)(1)(B). 
 22. Id. § 512(k)(1)(A). 
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service provider’s system or network who are repeat infringers; and (B) accommodates 
and does not interfere with standard technical measures.23 
Given the importance of qualifying for safe harbor immunity, some of 
the terms have required further clarification.  Where an “adopted and 
reasonably implemented” policy is concerned, case law has not yet defined 
the terms to any real degree of certainty.24  “Standard technical measures”25 
have been defined under the DMCA as those measures used “by copyright 
owners to identify or protect copyrighted works,”26 which “have been 
developed pursuant to a broad consensus of copyright owners and service 
providers in an open, fair, voluntary, multi-industry standards process.” 27 
A. Safe Harbor Immunity 
After defining what an OSP is, the next question is how one can qualify 
for safe harbor immunity.  An eligible OSP’s activities must fall under one 
of the four respective categories in subsections (a) through (d): (1) transitory 
digital network communications, (2) system caching, (3) information 
residing on systems or networks at direction of users, and (4) information 
location tools.28  YouTube is most concerned with the third category, under 
512(c), as its activities are primarily concerned with UGC that is uploaded 
and moved upon explicit user direction.29  Under section 512(c), an OSP 
providing services similar to that of YouTube is rendered immune from 
copyright infringement liability if it: 
(A)(i) does not have actual knowledge that the material or an activity uses the material on 
the system or network is infringing; 
(ii) in the absence of such actual knowledge, is not aware of facts or circumstances from 
which infringing activity is apparent; or 
(iii) upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to remove, or 
disable access to, the material; 
(B) does not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity, in a 
case in which the service provider has the right and ability to control such activity; and 
 
 23. Id. § 512(i)(1). 
 24. See Kim, supra note 7, at 54 (citing several different methods that courts nevertheless held 
to qualify as reasonable implementation). 
 25. 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(B). 
 26. Id. § 512(i)(2). 
 27. Id. § 512(i)(2)(A). 
 28. Id. § 512(a)–(d). 
 29. See About YouTube, supra note 3. 
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(C) upon notification of claimed infringement as described in paragraph (3), responds 
expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material that is claimed to be infringing 
or to be the subject of infringing activity.30 
Certain terms under section 512(c) have required further elaboration.  
As what constitutes “actual knowledge” can be problematic to define, 
Congress has recommended a “red flag” test31 that contains both a subjective 
and an objective element in determining whether an OSP possessed “actual 
knowledge.”32  While an OSP under this test “need not monitor its service or 
affirmatively seek facts indicating infringing activity (except to the extent 
consistent with a standard technical measure),”33 an OSP aware of a red flag 
must expeditiously remove it lest it loses its safe harbor immunity.34  
However, because each case will obviously differ in facts and 
circumstances, Congress has stated that “it is not possible to identify a 
uniform time limit for expeditious action.”35 
As for case law, courts have opted to apply a narrow definition in 
determining what would constitute “actual knowledge” and thus trigger an 
OSP’s obligation to act.  In Viacom, the district court held that where the 
actual or constructive knowledge of copyright infringement is concerned, 
there must be “knowledge of specific and identifiable infringements.”36  The 
holding was later substantially affirmed by the Second Circuit37 because “to 
require expeditious removal in the absence of specific knowledge or 
awareness” would culminate into an ill-constructed and formless obligation 
to take “commercially reasonable steps” in light of only a general awareness 
 
 30. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)–(C). 
 31. H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 53 (1998). 
 32. Id.  The subjective standard determines “the subjective awareness of the service provider 
of the facts or circumstances in question,” while the objective standard observes “whether infringing 
activity would have been apparent to a reasonable person operating under the same or similar 
circumstances.”  Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id.  Specifically, the report states that: 
 
“[O]nce a service provider obtains actual knowledge or awareness of facts or 
circumstances from which infringing material or activity on the service provider’s system 
or network is apparent, the service provider does not lose the limitation of liability . . . if 
it acts expeditiously to remove or disable access to the infringing material.” 
 
Id. 
 35. Id. at 53–54. 
 36. Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514, 523 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), rev’d, 676 
F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 37. Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 30 (2d Cir. 2012). 
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of infringing activity,38 and because this requirement would not be 
reconcilable with section 512(c).39 
B. The Takedown Notice 
The takedown notices sent by copyright holders are central to the safe 
harbor immunity for OSPs such as YouTube in relation to the wording of 
section 512(c).  On one hand, OSPs must have established an agent able to 
receive these notices;40 on the other, the DMCA states that claims of alleged 
infringement by copyright holders must “substantially”41 include: 
(i) A physical or electronic signature of a person authorized to act on behalf of the owner 
of an exclusive right that is allegedly infringed; 
(ii) Identification of the copyright work claimed to have been infringed, or, if multiple 
copyrighted works at a single online site are covered by a single notification, a 
representative list of such works at that site; 
(iii) Identification of the material that is claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of 
infringing activity and that is to be removed or access to which is to be disabled, and 
information reasonably sufficient to permit the service provider to locate the material; 
(iv) Information reasonably sufficient to permit the service provider to contact the 
complaining party, such as an address, telephone number, and if available, an electronic 
mail address at which the complaining party may be contacted; 
(v) A statement that the complaining party has a good faith belief that use of the material 
in the manner complained of is not authorized by the copyright owner, its agent, or the 
law; and 
(vi) A statement that the information in the notification is accurate, and under penalty of 
perjury, that the complaining party is authorized to act on behalf of the owner of an 
exclusive right that is allegedly infringed.42 
Notices that therefore substantially comply with the aforementioned 
requirements will prompt OSPs to act “expeditiously to remove, or disable 
access to, the material that is claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of 
 
 38. Id. at 30–31. 
 39. Id.  According to the court’s reasoning, 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii) requires the OSP to 
act “expeditiously to remove, or disable access to” the specific material in question, which could not 
simultaneously operate with an order to require expeditious removal where there was no specific 
knowledge or awareness of any infringing material.  Id.; see also UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter 
Capital Partners LLC, 667 F.3d 1022, 1037 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Requiring specific knowledge of 
particular infringing activity makes good sense in the context of the DMCA.”).   
 40. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(2) (2010). 
 41. Id. § 512(c)(3)(A). 
 42. Id. 
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infringing activity,”43 lest they run afoul of their obligations under section 
512(c) and lose their safe harbor immunity. 
C. The Counter Notice 
It is imperative to remember that the entire UGC notification process 
does not merely revolve around the demands of copyright holders alone; 
equally important are the requests made by users to have their videos 
returned to their previously re-uploaded places.  Upon content takedown, 
OSPs are directed to take “reasonable steps” to notify the subscriber of this 
fact.44  The DMCA has created a counter-notification process in which users 
accused of copyright infringement can alert OSPs that they have a “good 
faith” belief that the material uploaded was not infringing.45 
To be effective, a counter-notification sent to an OSP must 
“substantially”46 include: 
 
(A) A physical or electronic signature of the subscriber; 
(B) Identification of the material that has been removed or to which access has been 
disabled and the location at which the material appeared before it was removed or 
access to it was disabled; 
(C) A statement under penalty of perjury that the subscriber has a good faith belief 
that the material was removed or disabled as a result of mistake or misidentification 
of the material to be removed or disabled; and 
(D) The subscriber’s name, address, and telephone number, and a statement that the 
subscriber consents to the jurisdiction of Federal District Court for the judicial 
district in which the address is located, or if the subscriber’s address is outside of 
the United States, for any judicial district in which the service providers may be 
found, and that the subscriber will accept service of process from the person who 
provided notification under subsection (c)(1)(C) or an agent of such person.47 
Upon receiving a counter-notification, the OSP must promptly provide 
the copyright holder, who originally sent the takedown notice, a copy of the 
counter notice,48 alerting them that the removed material will no longer be 
disabled and will be put back online in ten business days,49 unless the 
copyright holder decides to file a lawsuit before that time and notifies the 
 
 43. Id. § 512(c)(1)(C). 
 44. Id. § 512(g)(2)(A). 
 45. Id. § 512(g)(3)(C). 
 46. Id. § 512(g)(3). 
 47. Id. § 512(g)(3)(A)–(D); see Counter-Notification Basics, YOUTUBE, 
www.youtube.com/t/copyright_counter (last visited Nov. 18, 2012). 
 48. Id. § 512(g)(2)(B). 
 49. Id. 
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OSP to that effect.50  Should no such notification from the copyright holder 
arrive after being sent a copy of the user’s counter-notification, the OSP is 
ordered to restore the material no more than fourteen days after receiving the 
counter notice.51 
D. Misrepresentation Claims 
Congress anticipated that copyright holders may become overzealous or 
possibly abusive in claiming copyright infringement; therefore, section 
512(f) was implemented as a way to establish “a right of action against any 
person who knowingly misrepresents”52 any material or online activity to be 
infringing, with defendants guilty of such actions liable for “any damages, 
including costs and attorneys’ fees, incurred by any of these parties as a 
result of the service provider’s reliance upon the misrepresentation.”53  It 
was Congress’s intention that this section would deter copyright holders 
from making “knowingly false allegations .†.†. in recognition that such 
misrepresentations are detrimental to rights holders, service providers, and 
Internet users.”54 
Section 512(f) creates a federal cause of action for misrepresentation 
and in its entirety states: 
(f) Misrepresentations.––Any person who knowingly materially misrepresents under this 
section–– 
(1) that material or activity is infringing, or 
(2) that material or activity was removed or disabled by mistake or 
misidentification, shall be liable for any damages, including costs and [attorney’s] 
fees incurred by the alleged infringer, by any copyright owner or copyright owner’s 
authorized licensee, or by a service provider, who is injured by such 
misrepresentation, as the result of the service provider relying upon such 
misrepresentation in removing or disabling access to the material or activity 
claimed to be infringing, or in replacing the removed material or ceasing to disable 
access to it. 55 
Succinctly stated, a section 512(f) claim can be brought by either a 
copyright holder or by a user of a UGC site in order to seek damages for 
 
 50. Id. § 512(g)(2)(C). 
 51. Id. 
 52. S. REP. NO. 105–190, at 49 (1998). 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. 17 U.S.C. § 512(f). 
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misrepresentation caused either by the copyright holder’s takedown notice or 
the user’s counter-notice. 
While the black letter text of the statute appears equitable, as applied in 
case law section 512(f) has made bringing successful misrepresentation 
claims more challenging. Two cases in particular stand out. 
1. Rossi v. Motion Picture Association of America56 
Michael J. Rossi owned and operated a website under the domain name 
“internetmovies.com” since 1997 and described the website as an “online 
magazine” that gave users a directory of websites that provided information 
about movies.57  Visitors were told that obtaining membership would allow 
them to “download full length movies .†.†. every month.”58 
The Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) is an American 
trade association that provides ratings and content protection for films.59  
After becoming aware of Rossi’s website, the MPAA sent several takedown 
notices to both Rossi and his internet service provider (ISP).60  Rossi 
subsequently found another ISP to host internetmovies.com, and filed suit 
against the MPAA for a number of state claims; however, none of them 
included a section 512(f) claim of misrepresentation.61  Notwithstanding the 
absence of a section 512(f) claim, the Ninth Circuit decided to review de 
novo the district court’s interpretation of the Copyright Act62 and discussed 
section 512(f) anyway.63 
Although Rossi did not dispute that the MPAA complied with the 
DMCA takedown procedures under section 512(c)(3), he argued “the 
MPAA did not have sufficient information to form a ‘good faith belief’ 
under § 512(c)(3)(A)(v) that [he] was illegally infringing the MPAA 
copyrights.”64  In the course of considering Rossi’s contention, the Ninth 
Circuit opted for a subjective good faith standard instead of an objective 
standard.65  Because Rossi’s website contained statements such as “Full 
 
 56. Rossi v. Motion Picture Ass’n of Am. Inc., 391 F.3d 1000 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 57. Id. at 1001–02. 
 58. Id. at 1002. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 1002–03. 
 63. Id. at 1004–05. 
 64. Id. at 1003. 
 65. Id. at 1004.  In deciding which standard to apply, the Ninth Circuit looked to prior case 
law and the statutory structure of 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) to come to its conclusion that subjective good 
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Length Downloadable Movies”; “NOW DOWNLOADABLE”; and “Join to 
download full length movies online now! new movies every month,” the 
Court held that the “unequivocal language used by Rossi . . . virtually 
[compelled]” the conclusion “that motion pictures owned by MPAA 
members were available for immediate downloading from the website,”66 a 
conclusion that Rossi admitted.67 
In reaching this conclusion, the Ninth Circuit expounded on the required 
subjective state of mind necessary to bring a valid claim for 
misrepresentation.  According to the Court, a copyright holder under section 
512(f) “cannot be liable simply because an unknowing mistake is made, 
even if the copyright owner acted unreasonably in making the mistake.  
Rather, there must be a demonstration of some actual knowledge of 
misrepresentation on the part of the copyright owner.”68 
2. Lenz v. Universal Music Corp.69 
On February 7, 2007, Stephanie Lenz uploaded a twenty-nine second 
video recording of her children onto YouTube.70  For twenty-one seconds in 
the video, the song “Let’s Go Crazy” by Prince could be heard in the 
background, “albeit with difficulty given the poor sound quality of the 
video.”71  Several months later, copyright holder Universal issued a DMCA 
takedown notice to YouTube and demanded that YouTube remove the video 
for copyright infringement.72  Lenz later sent YouTube a counter-
notification, asserting that her video constituted fair use73 of the song and 
 
faith belief on the part of copyright holders was the proper standard.  Id.  For the full implication of 
the subjective standard, see infra note 81. 
 66. Rossi, 391 F.3d at 1005. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id (citation omitted). 
 69. Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150 (N.D. Cal. 2008). 
 70. Id. at 1151–52. 
 71. Id. at 1152. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 1155.  17 U.S.C. § 107 lists the four factors considered in determining fair use: 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial 
nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work 
as a whole; and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. 
Id. 
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thus did not infringe upon any copyright.74  The video was reposted six 
weeks later.75 
Although Lenz saw the return of her video, she nevertheless filed suit 
against Universal for misrepresentation under section 512(f) in addition to 
claims of tortious interference against her contract with YouTube.76  The 
court considered whether section 512(c)(3)(A)(v) of the DMCA “requires a 
copyright owner to consider the fair use doctrine in formulating a good faith 
belief that ‘use of the material in the manner complained of is not authorized 
by the copyright owner, its agent, or the law.’”77  The Lenz court first noted 
that when issuing a takedown notice, copyright holders must, among other 
requirements, provide a statement that they possess “a good faith belief that 
the use of the material in the manner complained of is not authorized by the 
copyright owner, its agent, or the law.”78  However, the court also stated that 
while a full investigation by a copyright holder to verify the accuracy of its 
own claims of infringement was not required, it nevertheless had to consider 
the fair use doctrine as part of its initial review as to whether the takedown 
notice should be issued in the first place.79  Therefore, in order to make a 
takedown request in good faith, “the owner must evaluate whether the 
material makes fair use of the copyright.”80 
Nonetheless, the earlier holding requiring subjective bad faith in Rossi is 
still applicable in Lenz given that both cases operate under Ninth Circuit 
jurisdiction.  Thus, although a copyright holder has to consider possible fair 
use in making a takedown notice, a user nevertheless is still required to 
provide evidence of subjective bad faith on the copyright holder’s part when 
it decided to issue the takedown notification.81 
III. A CHANGE IS REQUIRED 
YouTube’s existing mode of operation can probably be described as 
troublesome at best from the point of view of its users.  Although Congress 
 
 74. Id. at 1152. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 1153. 
 77. Id. at 1154. 
 78. Id. at 1153; 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A). 
 79. Lenz, 572 F. Supp. 2d at 1155–56. 
 80. Id. at 1154. 
 81. See supra note 68; see also Kathleen O’Donnell, Lenz v. Universal Music Corp. and the 
Potential Effect of Fair Use Analysis Under the Takedown Procedures of § 512 of the DMCA, 2009 
DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 10, 19 (2009) (“The subjective bad faith standard imposed by Rossi makes it 
exceedingly difficult for an end-user to succeed in a claim for misrepresentation against a copyright 
holder.”). 
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has attempted to address all possible issues, the DMCA as executed does not 
equitably balance the needs of all parties involved. 
In 2011 the number of takedown notices sent by copyright holders to 
OSPs for any kind of infringing material whatsoever was at an all-time high, 
and the number only grows higher with every passing year.82  In October 
2011 alone, 3,904 copyright holders and reporting organizations filed an 
astonishing combined total of approximately 8,500,000 takedown requests to 
Google alone, YouTube’s purchaser83 for URLs alone.84  This number would 
be even higher were it not for: (1) the infringement report caps implemented 
by Google;85 (2) Google’s decision to filter out copyright removal requests 
received for other products aside from just Google Search;86 and (3) 
Google’s decision to filter out takedown requests sent by means other than 
Google’s online web form.87 
YouTube itself is no exception even when solely considered; MIT-
research project YouTomb tracks videos taken down from YouTube for 
supposed copyright infringement.88  In monitoring just the top 450,000 
popular videos present on YouTube in 2009, not taking into account the 
number of videos taken down by YouTube’s own Content ID, YouTomb 
 
 82. Transparency Report, GOOGLE, www.google.com/transparencyreport/removals/copyright 
(last visited Nov. 15, 2012).  As Google’s graph demonstrates, the number of requests in large part 
only continue to grow. Id. 
 83. See supra note 4; see also Jonathan Bailey, Why Are Google DMCA Notices 
Skyrocketing?, PLAGIARISMTODAY (Sept. 11, 2012), www.plagiarismtoday.com/2012/9/11/why-
google-dmca-notices-skyrocketing/. 
 84. A large amount of takedown requests sent for copyright infringement in general are 
automated, created when material scanned through computer filters triggers an alarm. See, e.g., Dave 
Neal, Warner Brothers Criticised for ‘Robo Takedowns’, THE INQUIRER (Mar. 7, 2012, 11:22AM), 
www.theinquirer.net/inquirer/news/2157660/warner-brothers-criticised-robo-takedowns; Ernesto, 
Microsoft DMCA Notice ‘Mistakenly’ Targets BBC, Techcrunch, Wikipedia, and U.S. Govt, 
TORRENTFREAK (Oct. 7, 2012), http://torrentfreak.com/microsofts-bogus-dmca-notices-censor-bbc-
cnn-wikipedia-spotify-and-more-121007/. For an example of what an automated or “robo” takedown 
looks like, see Images DMCA (Copyright) Complaint to Google, CHILLING EFFECTS, 
www.chillingeffects.org/dmca512c/notice.cgi?NoticeID=205681 (last visited Nov. 15, 2012). 
 85. Music Notes Blog, Some Clear Facts About Google’s “Transparency” Report, RIAA, 
(May 30, 2012), http://riaa.com/blog.php?content_selector=riaa-news-blog&blog_selector=Clear-
Facts-&blog_type=&news_month_filter=5&news_year_filter=2012. 
 86. See supra note 82 (“Requests for products other than Google Search (e.g., requests 
directed at YouTube or Blogger) are not included.”). 
 87. See supra note 82  (“Requests submitted by means other than our web form, such as fax or 
written letter are not included.”). 
 88. About, YOUTOMB, youtomb.mit.edu/about (last visited Nov. 15, 2012). 
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detected that at least 9,760 were taken down after a takedown notice was 
sent by a copyright holder.89 
There would be nothing wrong with any of the aforementioned statistics 
if it were assumed that each and every takedown notice was for genuinely 
infringing material.  Yet, in 2009, Google published a report noting that 
more than half of the takedown notices it received under the DMCA (57%) 
were sent by businesses against their competitors, and over a third of all 
notices (37%) were invalid copyright claims.90  The list of material that can 
and has been subject to takedowns extended to seemingly unfathomable 
levels in just 2012: the sounds of nature that were overheard when a user 
recorded and uploaded a video of him harvesting plants to make a salad;91 a 
livestream of Michelle Obama’s speech at the 2012 Democratic National 
Convention;92 NASA’s public domain footage of the Curiosity rover landing 
on Mars;93 a video of President Obama singing the opening line to Al 
Green’s “Let’s Stay Together” assembled by the Mitt Romney presidential 
campaign staff;94 and the Hugo Awards’ livestream in September of that 
year.95 
Even if the media conglomerates responsible apologize, and claim that 
their copyright detection algorithms detected a false positive, the fact 
remains that this is not the first time, or even one of the few times, that this 
 
 89. Video Status, YOUTOMB, youtomb.mit.edu/statistics (last visited Nov. 15, 2012). Some of 
the biggest issuers of takedown notices in 2009 included: Warner Music Group (approximately 935 
videos); Viacom International, Inc. (approximately 419 videos); TV TOKYO Corporation 
(approximately 309 videos); and BBC Worldwide, Ltd., (approximately 206 videos). Id. 
 90. European Digital Rights, The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) as a Model?, 
edri.org/files/0409_unintcons.pdf (last visited Nov. 15, 2012); Mike Masnick, Google Provides 
Numbers on Just How Often DMCA Takedown Process is Abused, TECHDIRT (Mar. 18, 2009, 
9:19AM), www.techdirt.com/articles/20090315/2033134126.shtml; see also Ted Gibbons, Google 
Submission Hammers Section 92A, PCWORLD NEW ZEALAND (Mar. 15, 2009), 
http://pcworld.co.nz/pcworld/pcw.nsf/feature/google-submission-hammers-section-92a. 
 91. Andy Baio, Copyright Kings are Judge, Jury and Executioner on YouTube, WIRED (Feb. 
29, 2012), www.wired.com/business/2012/02/opinion-baiodmcayoutube/. The company that claimed 
copyright was Rumblefish, a music licensing company. Id. 
 92. Ryan Singel, YouTube Flags Democrats’ Convention Video on Copyright Grounds, 
WIRED (Sept. 5, 2012, 12:10 AM), www.wired.com/threatlevel/2012/09/youtube-flags-democrats-
convention-video-on-copyright-grounds/. 
 93. Alex Pasternack, NASA’s Mars Rover Crashed Into a DMCA Takedown, MOTHERBOARD, 
http://motherboard.vice.com/blog/nasa-s-mars-rover-crashed-into-a-dmca-takedown (last visited 
Dec. 14, 2012). 
 94. Timothy B. Lee, Music Publisher Uses DMCA to Take Down Romney Ad of Obama 
Crooning, ARSTECHNICA (Jul. 16 2012, 4:59 PM), www.arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2012/07/major-
label-uses-dmca-to-take-down-romney-ad-of-obama-crooning/. 
 95. Annalee Newitz, How Copyright Enforcement Robots Killed the Hugo Awards, IO9 (Sep. 
3, 2012, 10:25 AM), http://io9.com/5940036/how-copyright-enforcement-robots-killed-the-hugo-
awards. 
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has happened.  For example, Scripps News Service, the private corporation 
responsible for the takedown of the Curiosity Mars rover livestream, was 
also responsible for the temporary takedown of a video of one of NASA’s 
space shuttles being ferried by a 747 in April of the same year.96  According 
to NASA, NASA either suffers inaccurate takedowns of their videos 
approximately once a month or is forcibly inundated with ads from the 
fraudulent copyright infringement claimant, with claims covering almost 
everything from “imagery to music.”97 
Even worse than false positives is when copyright holders are 
unapologetically abusive concerning the scope of their takedown abilities.  
In 2011, Universal Music Group (UMG) issued a takedown notice against 
Megaupload’s “Mega Song,” hosted on YouTube, even though it did not 
own the rights to anything in the video.98  By means of a rebuttal, UMG 
responded that it had the “right to block or remove user-posted videos 
through YouTube’s [copyright management system] based on a number of 
contractually specified criteria” through a supposedly private contractual 
agreement with YouTube which lay outside of the DMCA’s provisions.99  
Although YouTube later refuted UMG’s statement to the contrary, troubling 
questions are nevertheless raised concerning UMG’s attempt to circumvent 
the DMCA takedown rules.  The uploading user cannot even utilize the 
provisions the DMCA has allotted against the infringement claimant even 
though it was a supposed “non-DMCA takedown” because of UMG’s goal 
that even if it takes down a video that it does not own the copyright to, the 
uploading user cannot even utilize the provisions the DMCA has allotted  
against the infringement claimant because it was a supposed “non-DMCA 
takedown.” 100 
Despite all these aforementioned statistics and examples, YouTube has 
nevertheless said that it will “not manually review copyright-infringement 
claims before its system automatically blocks disputed footage,” but instead 
 
 96. Alex Pasternack, NASA’s Mars Rover Crashed into a DMCA Takedown, MOTHERBOARD, 
http://motherboard.vice.com/blog/nasa-s-mars-rover-crashed-into-a-dmca-takedown (last visited 
Dec. 14, 2012). 
 97. Id. 
 98.  Timothy B. Lee, UMG Claims “Right to Block or Remove” YouTube Videos it Doesn’t 
Own, ARSTECHNICA (Dec. 15, 2011, 11:05 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2011/12/umg-
we-have-the-right-to-block-or-remove-youtube-videos/. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id.  YouTube later stated that “Our partners do not have the right to take down videos from 
YouTube unless they own the rights to them or they are live performances controlled through 
exclusive agreements with their artists,” and reinstated the “Mega Song.” Id. 
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opts to send some of the flagged material to the copyright holders itself to 
decide if there has been an infringement violation.101  This is somewhat 
unfortunate since copyright holders cannot be considered a neutral party and 
have been shown to make fraudulent claims a high percentage of the time; 
yet at the same time, users who wish to sue copyright holders must first 
obtain proof of subjective bad faith before a valid claim for 
misrepresentation can be brought.102 
In short, a change is required.  Comparing the millions of takedown 
requests generated every single day to the comparatively small number of 
counter-notice claims sent by users103 suggests that the DMCA in actual 
practice has created a system with high disparity in regards to each party’s 
ability to be heard.  While one reason why the number of counter-
notifications created is not higher can likely be attributed to some users’ 
ignorance that there is a dispute process to begin with, let alone how it even 
works; another reason can stem from users’ reluctance to send a counter-
notification at all.  This reluctance is known as the chilling effect. 
A. Payment 
Currently, any resolution process for infringement claims on YouTube 
is litigation-based.  As stated earlier, a user who files a counter-notification 
exposes himself or herself, among other things, to a possible lawsuit in a 
federal district court should the copyright holder decide to file suit.104  
Litigation can be prohibitively expensive, especially if a party appeals a 
judgment it consider unfavorable.  As the average person who has witnessed 
a takedown of his material most likely is not financially prepared (if ever) to 
pay legal fees, the costs of litigation alone can stand as a considerable 
counterweight in the litigation process. 
 
 101. David Kravets, Google Says It Won’t ‘Manually’ Review YouTube Vids for Infringement, 
WIRED (Oct. 4, 2012, 7:49 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2012/10/youtube-infringement/. 
 102. See supra notes 65, 68 and accompanying text. 
 103. As of this writing, there does not seem to be any available list that tracks the total amount 
of counter-notifications filed by YouTube users against claims of alleged infringement by copyright 
holders. However, given the stringent requirements to file just a single counter-notification, see 
supra notes 46-47, and the fact that copyright holders can and have sent as an aggregate whole 
millions of takedown requests many of which are automated via copyright “bots” which require no 
human time or review before they are sent, see supra note 83, it is incredibly unlikely that the total 
amount of counter-notifications created can even come close in comparison let alone match or 
surpass. 
 104. See supra note 47. 
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B. Balance of Power 
Given the aforementioned DMCA provisions and case law listed prior in 
Part II, it would not be incongruous to state that copyright holders possess an 
impetus to achieve their objectives that supersedes what a typical user might 
normally have.  Succinctly restated: (1) a copyright holder only has to 
“substantially” include the requirements listed under the DMCA in issuing a 
takedown notice;105 (2) an OSP must act expeditiously to remove or disable 
access to the allegedly infringing material once served with the takedown 
notice;106 (3) infringing material can be taken down, monetized with ads, or 
tracked (all possible before any notification is sent by the OSP to the 
user);107 (4) an OSP must only take “reasonable steps” to notify users of a 
counter-notification process;108 (5) a counter notice submitted by a user 
provides his or her personal information and exposes him or her to federal 
court jurisdiction;109 (6) a copyright holder is only liable in a suit for 
misrepresentation if the user provides evidence that the misrepresentation 
was done with subjective bad faith;110 and (7) while a copyright holder must 
take into account possible fair use in deciding to issue a takedown notice, the 
standard is nevertheless still based upon a subjective good faith belief on the 
part of the copyright holder.111 
With all these conditions arranged in such a manner that clearly benefits 
the copyright holder over the user, it is not surprising that many users decide 
to forego the counter-notification process altogether, creating the previously 
mentioned chilling effect.  The resulting situation is justifiably worrisome, 
as the lack of an opposing side willing to dispute claims can only lead to 
abuse and exploitation of the takedown process.  If no real incentive exists 
on the part of users to dispute infringement claims, then there is nothing 
preventing an unscrupulous copyright holder from taking advantage through 
fraudulent means and misrepresentation to censor and control whatever 
UGC they wish with impunity. 
It is clear that the current DMCA process urgently requires renovation. 
 
 105. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A) (2010). 
 106. See supra note 30. 
 107. See supra note 12. 
 108. See supra note 44. 
 109. See supra note 47. 
 110. See supra note 65. 
 111. See supra notes 77–80. 
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IV. ONLINE ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION AS THE NEW DISPUTE 
PARADIGM 
While the issues previously listed in this article have been discussed 
before in varying lengths, a clarion call has yet to be made for the 
application of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) in regard to UGC 
disputes, let alone an online ADR process (ODR).  In contrast to the existing 
litigation-friendly paradigm, this article posits that ODR is much more likely 
to achieve an equitable result than both traditional litigation and ADR, while 
ensuring that all parties have a chance to make their voices heard. 
As stated in Part II, the DMCA was enacted in 1998 with the goal of 
modernizing copyright law in light of the new technological age brought on 
by the Internet.112  However, since the DMCA’s initial inception, both 
technology and the American legal system have evolved, thus adding on 
new techniques that Congress could not have completely foreseen.  The 
concept of ODR is a byproduct of that technological evolution. 
A. Location-Based Jurisdiction and its Problems 
Traditionally, having both parties arrive at a specific physical location to 
litigate has worked well enough in administering justice.  In these disputes, 
two issues (personal and subject matter jurisdiction) have been important, 
especially if the two opposing parties hailed from different states. 
Parties could avoid the uncertainty of the personal jurisdiction 
determinations by agreeing to a forum selection clause from the outset, like 
how YouTube users currently agree to federal court jurisdiction if they 
submit a counter-notification in response to a video takedown.113  Forum 
selection clauses can be convenient because they preclude personal 
jurisdiction issues since the parties have already agreed upon where to 
litigate.114  However, although forum selection clauses can provide 
predictability and contribute to the efficiency of the judicial system, they can 
be held inequitable in practice, as it is a possibility that the party drafting the 
forum selection clause will choose a jurisdiction that is beneficial for its 
 
 112. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
 113. Marjorie A. Shields, Annotation, Permissive or Mandatory Nature of Forum Selection 
Clauses Under State Law, 32 A.L.R. 6th 419 § 2 (2008); see supra notes 44-47. 
 114. See J. Zak Ritchie, A Tie that Binds: Forum Selection Clause Enforceability in West 
Virginia, 113 W. VA. L. REV. 95, 96 (2010) (“[F]orum selection clauses . . . may reduce uncertainty 
as to where a potential plaintiff will file suit.”). 
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purposes,115 whether it be in terms of the distance needed to travel or, a more 
favorable jury pool.  Forum selection clauses also exist under their own 
analogous sword of Damocles—an ever-present risk that the clause itself 
might become the subject of litigation and possibly held by a court to be 
unconscionable and thus void for any number of reasons.116  Lastly, even a 
perfectly equitable forum selection clause can still cost litigants a high fee 
amount in both court costs and travel expenses.  As long as the current 
paradigm revolves around an assumption of litigation through physical 
presence in a courtroom, the previously mentioned issues will never be fully 
assuaged. 
B. Introducing Online Dispute Resolution and its Benefits 
The general advantages of ADR mechanisms and processes when 
compared to traditional litigation have not gone unnoticed by legal analysts 
and scholars.117  In contrast to physical litigation and ADR, ODR resolves all 
physical issues of personal jurisdiction, as the forum in which grievances 
would are be aired is an online interactive medium that is closest to the 
nearest accessible (and hopefully secure) computer with an Internet 
 
 115. See, e.g., Fred Galves, Virtual Justice as Reality: Making the Resolution of E-Commerce 
Disputes More Convenient, Legitimate, Efficient, and Secure, 2009 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 1, 
32–33 (2009). 
 116. For example, two possible reasons include if the forum selection clause’s enforcement 
“would contravene a strong public policy of the forum in which the suit is brought, whether declared 
by statute or by judicial decision,” or if the forum clause would be “seriously inconvenient for the 
trial of the action.”  M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1972).  Other reasons 
can include fraud or overreaching or if a forum selection clause would cost an out-of-state plaintiff 
more via litigation than the actual cost of the damages as a way to deter any litigation.  Id.; see 
Galves, supra note 115, at 31. 
 117. See Aashit Shah, Using ADR to Resolve Online Disputes, 10 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 25, 18–24 
(2004) (stating that traditional litigation is “inconvenient, impractical, time-consuming, and 
prohibitive,” and that ADR is non-confrontational, efficacious, neutral, and less costly among other 
benefits); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Dispute Resolution in Cyberspace: Demand for New Forms of ADR, 
15 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 675, 675–76 (2000) (noting that “ADR mechanisms offer lower 
costs, reassure participants, and solve the jurisdictional problem because use of them manifests 
consent” as well as containing a “readily available fund” to satisfy a decision for either party); 
Leonard L. Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 29, 34 (1982) (“Mediation offers some 
clear advantages over adversary processing: it is cheaper, faster, and potentially more hospitable to 
unique solutions that take more fully into account nonmaterial interests of the disputants.”); John 
Hartje, Chapter 48. Alternative Dispute Resolution, 4 N.Y. PRAC., COM. LITIG. IN NEW YORK STATE 
COURTS § 48:2 (3d ed.) (asserting that whereas traditional litigation can be costly and that the “vast 
majority of cases settle or are otherwise resolved before trial,” it is better to use ADR to expedite 
early settlement before legal fees mount). 
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connection.  Even ADR, the benefits of which will be discussed in the 
following paragraphs, still necessitates that the parties meet somewhere 
physically.  Requiring only a computer would mitigate any travel expenses 
or inconveniences, and any attempt by one party to have a “home turf” 
advantage by being more familiar with the jurisdiction’s judges or jury pool 
than the other party is either lessened or eliminated.118  In this sense, ODR 
would act as the great equalizer, ensuring that any disparity the dispute may 
commence with is reduced as much as possible. 
As noted by other authors, ADR has generally been construed as more 
cooperative than courtroom litigation since ADR removes “many of the cold 
formalities . . . that often result in bitterness between parties,”119 such as 
motions or other tactics that can be abused in order to obfuscate the issues, 
delay litigation, and pile up legal fees.  In contrast, ADR would minimize 
the chances of pointless protraction occurring in the first place because such 
methods are not normally available in an ADR setting.120 
The comparative efficacy and haste with which ADR cases are resolved 
when compared to their litigious brethren is also something that should be 
taken into account.  Trials can take months to resolve––not accounting for 
the wait before a case is even heard in the first place121––whereas ADR can 
resolve a case in weeks.122 
Another advantage of ODR is that unlike ADR and traditional litigation, 
parties would not have to look at each other while negotiating.  This can be 
beneficial for parties that are completely unaccustomed to any sort of legal 
proceeding (although an ideal ODR system would have a video counterpart 
available if needed).  While for some this might be considered detracting 
because it would “dehumanize” the parties, for others that exact reason 
might be considered a boon.  When a party is staring at a computer screen 
instead of an actual live audience, fears that might stem from public 
speaking anxieties or difficulties are diminished, and the parties have an 
opportunity to carefully think over their entries prior to written submission 
 
 118. Galves, supra note 115, at 32. 
 119. Id. at 40. 
 120. Id. at 41.  (“Because these motions do not exist in an ADR forum, it improves the chances 
that the bitterness inherent in the beginning stages of traditional litigation will be avoided by the use 
of ADR.”). 
 121. David A. Hoffman, et al., Alternatives to Litigation, CIVP MA-CLE § 10.1, § 10.4.1(b) 
(2008).  A case can sometimes wait three to five years before it is available for trial in both Superior 
and Federal District Courts. Id. 
 122. See, e.g., Mark Albright, The Advantages and Disadvantages of ADR, ALBRIGHT 
STODDARD BLOG (Sep. 21, 2012, 12:11 AM), www.albrightstoddard.com/blog/bid/223519/The-
Advantages-And-Disadvantages-of ADR; Alternative Dispute Resolution, SUPERIOR COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF FRESNO, www.fresno.courts.ca.gov/alternative_dispute_resolution/ (last 
visited Dec. 14, 2012). 
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in order to ensure that only the most developed arguments are submitted.  
The absence of immediate human interaction in front of an opposing party 
also means that the other party cannot use physical, intimidation, or 
pressure, through body language, nor can any actual bias (classism, 
personality, sexism, racism, bodily tics, etc.) come into play, as both parties 
would be reduced to nothing more than their respective arguments on a 
screen, something traditional litigation and ADR cannot provide given their 
physical nature.  The absence of these factors helps to ensure that the parties 
are focused solely on the issue at hand without any distracting nuances. 
Additionally, each party would be able to post at its own convenience 
since the two parties are not stuck in a singular physical location during the 
proceedings (although it could certainly be argued that this has its own 
advantages by making the parties more invested in coming to an equitable 
agreement), or the parties could agree to a specific online session in order to 
work through things as quickly as possible.  To ensure efficiency and haste, 
the parties could also agree under ODR to make their arguments at their 
convenience as long as all submissions are within a certain time frame.  Not 
only would this ensure that each party to make the best arguments for its 
positions, but this method would also guarantee flexibility in submissions. 
Furthermore, ADR and ODR are more advantageous than traditional 
litigation in that they permit private resolution rather than a public 
resolution.123  This can be beneficial to the parties if they wish to assert their 
claims, however tenuous they may be, but possess a desire to avoid public 
embarrassment or humiliation by a loss in the judicial system.  In arbitration, 
for example, the final resolution is made public “only if one of the parties 
seeks intervention by the court to enforce, modify, or vacate the decision” of 
the arbitrator.124 
Lastly, because all arguments and files uploaded in ODR would be 
recorded and accessible by the parties, it would provide an easily accessible 
method for either party should any later disagreements arise during 
enforcement of the ODR resolution.125 
 
 123. See supra note 121, at § 10.4.1(a). 
 124. See id. 
 125. Although it is not unlikely that lawyers would be available for certain parties, the point of 
ODR is to provide for an alternative dispute resolution forum where the common layperson would 
be able to air their grievances and requests. This latter point is of particular import here, as it is 
unlikely that the average UGC-site user would hire a lawyer (whose legal fees can be prohibitively 
expensive) to dispute something so small as a YouTube video (unless they had stronger ties to it, 
such as if it were their own original product, for example). 
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C. Enforcement and Appeals 
Should a dispute come to a unsatisfying final resolution for all the 
parties involved, the ideal ODR system126 would have an appeal process that 
would permit each party to submit its respective appellate briefs, which 
would allow for a different ODR judge127who would either affirm or deny 
the previous resolution.  This would ensure that there is an enacted appeals 
process available for those who feel that justice has not been served, yet still 
remain comparatively less expensive and time-consuming than traditional 
litigation or ADR. 
Enforcement would not be an issue here as the resolution, as far as UGC 
is concerned, is binary in nature.  The material considered is either online or 
offline and control over the material is not in the hands of either party but 
under YouTube (or any other analogous OSP) itself.  All that would be 
required would be a notice sent to YouTube to alert it of the final resolution 
between the two disputing parties and for it to comply with the instructions 
contained therein. 
V. ADDITIONAL IMPLEMENTATION 
Although implementing ODR as a replacement for the current litigation-
friendly paradigm would make the YouTube dispute process much more 
equitable for both parties as a whole, additional steps must be taken in order 
to ensure that ODR is a worthwhile process for those involved.  These steps 
require that: (1) ODR must be offered prior to takedown in at least some 
capacity; (2) larger fines should be levied against copyright infringement 
claimants in cases of misrepresentation; (3) trust funds for representation 
should be implemented in order to assist users in paying their ODR fees 
during the process; and (4) the respective holdings in Rossi and Lenz should 
be overruled. 
 
 126. In so far as the ODR system is concerned, while private companies such as Google could 
adopt it, it might be better if there were a national system implemented in place by act of Congress; 
the danger inherent with private corporations implementing their own ODR programs is the ever-
present risk that they would try to influence the ODR system as much as they could in favor of 
copyright holders so as to avoid lawsuits against the private companies themselves. 
 127. These ODR judges would be a neutral third party in the dispute, either hailing from a 
hypothetical company that could be hired to provide qualified arbitrators who were familiar with 
online technologies, or through a national governmental group which would assign said arbitrators as 
needed.  It is important that OSPs are not in charge of choosing the arbitrator, as there would be the 
risk that they would choose arbitrators biased in favor towards copyright holders in order to avoid 
any lawsuits against the OSP.  See supra note 125 and accompanying text. 
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A. ODR Must be Offered Prior to Takedown in at Least Some Capacity 
As mentioned before, the current dispute process takes down allegedly 
infringing material, and sends a contemporaneous notice to the user alerting 
the user regardless if the action is based on a Content ID match or a 
copyright holder takedown notice.128  It is only after the user submits a 
dispute counter-notification and the copyright holder fails to respond, backs 
down, or loses the lawsuit, that the user can have his or her material reposted 
onto the site for public viewing.129  Copyright holders might argue that their 
“take down first, ask questions later” ability is crucial in preventing 
copyright infringement where new material has just been released.  To some 
degree, it is not difficult to see the validity of this line of thought.  For 
example, if a singer had just released his or her new album, and soon 
thereafter, a user on YouTube started to provide free copies of it through one 
of his or her videos in violation of a copyright, it would obviously be 
imperative to take down the infringing material as soon as possible to 
prevent illicit downloads.  However, the problem is that it is too easy for 
copyright holders to simply claim that all supposed matches found by their 
detection algorithms are as immediately dire of a situation as the one 
presented above when that might not be the case at all (leaving aside the 
aforementioned topic of whether the claimed materials infringed upon is 
even theirs in the first place). 
A grace period, even if it is a day or two, should be offered by OSPs so 
that the user can be notified and be given a chance to dispute the takedown 
notice/Content ID match through ODR before the material is taken offline, 
even if the time period is as short as a day or two.  Any time frame would 
conceptually be superior to the current system, where the user is already 
placed at a disadvantage.  This concession may seem to be too much for 
copyright holders, but it is not impossible to conceive that the user, who is 
an independent artist, for example, desperately needs the material to be 
available for public consumption and sharing in order to advertise.  A 
takedown of any sort (erroneous or otherwise) would take time away from 
dispute/litigation that would otherwise have been used for the advertising 
effort or for other needs.  It is certainly possible that by the time the user is 
able to get the material reposted online, it is too late and the damage is done.  
This “critical point in time” argument is, at best, inequitable.  Once ODR 
 
 128. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
 129. See supra notes 49–51. 
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starts, if the user fails to demonstrate that he or she owns the rights to the 
material at issue or can raise a defense, such as fair use, then the usual 
section 512(f) misrepresentation penalties would apply130 along with any 
other punitive measure that the OSP deems necessary.  This would force 
users to be more hesitant prior to introducing fraudulent claims in the hopes 
of exploiting the new ODR dispute system and would encourage copyright 
holders to participate more willingly. 
Should YouTube and similar OSPs offer this new dispute process, it is 
likely that copyright holders would attempt to bring lawsuit alleging that the 
implementation of this new dispute plan is in violation of DMCA safe 
harbor provisions.  However, given the somewhat ambiguous language of 
section 512(c) of the DMCA131 and since “actual knowledge” is contingent 
upon “knowledge of specific and identifiable infringements” by the OSP as 
held by the court in Viacom,132 the OSPs could argue that providing the user 
with a mandatory grace period to initiate ODR prior to automatic takedown 
would not violate their duties to act expeditiously in removing or disabling 
access to the allegedly infringing material133 that was found with imperfect 
(and often automated) detection algorithms.134  After all, there is no uniform 
time limit as to what would constitute an expeditious removal.135 
The manual review of every single claim of copyright infringement on 
YouTube is not being asked, since that would require astronomical costs136 
and would be impracticable, if not impossible, to execute.  However, 
YouTube needs to engage in proactive behavior that would provide the user 
with a chance to at least initiate ODR and offer his or her voice in the matter 
before his or her material is taken down. 
 
 130. See supra notes 52–55. 
 131. See supra notes 31–32 and accompanying text. 
 132. See supra note 36. 
 133. See supra note 30. 
 134. See supra notes 91–95 and accompanying text. 
 135. See supra note 35. 
 136. Engineer Craig Mansfield calculated via a mathematical formula available on his website 
that manually reviewing every single video for possible copyright infringement would require almost 
200,000 judges working 120 work weeks every single week with no holidays in order to cover all the 
new material coming in every second.  Craig Mansfield, An Engineer’s Cost Analysis of Video 
Screening on YouTube, CRAIG’S THAWTS (May 23, 2012, 5:32 PM), 
blog.cdmansfield.com/2012/05/23/an-engineers-cost-analysis-of-video-screening-on-youtube/.  It 
would cost Google $37 billion a year.  See Chase Hoffberger, Pre-screening Videos Would Cost 
YouTube $37 Billion a Year, THE DAILY DOT (May 30, 2012), www.dailydot.com/news/youtube-
prescreen-copyright-37-billion/; 
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B. Larger Fines for Cases of Misrepresentation 
On average, copyright holders send thousands of DMCA takedown 
notices every year, and the number will only increase as time goes on.137  
Unfortunately, as earlier examples have shown, the automated takedown 
system is not perfect.  Copyright holders are responsible for targeting and 
taking down material that is unlikely to be subject to takedown in the first 
place (the sounds of nature),138 content that is clearly for the public domain 
yet is still subject to takedown monthly (videos posted by NASA taken 
down by Scripp News Service),139 and even material they owned no rights to 
(the Megaupload “Mega Song” and UMG’s subsequent remarks).140  
Although these examples show a spectrum of copyright issues, with genuine 
mistakes caused by inaccurate or deliberate actions taken, none of it matters 
if copyright holders are not given serious incentives to remedy their actions.  
Larger fines automatically placed on false claimants would guarantee that 
copyright holders would not be nearly as eager to send out takedown notices 
en masse if they were required to pay them for every single instance of 
misrepresentation. 
C. Representation Trust Fund 
In addition to larger fines for instances of misrepresentation, users 
would be much more likely to file a counter-notice and use the ODR dispute 
process if their fees could be reduced to some degree.  A nationwide trust 
fund for legal representation for ODR users could be created by placing the 
fines successfully levied against copyright holders.  These fines would 
encourage copyright holders to act more carefully in their takedown notices 
and, allow future plaintiffs to use their comparatively newfound fiscal 
freedom to initiate more disputes.  A trust fund of this nature would also 
provide peace of mind to users who wish to voice their complaints but are 
reluctant to do so primarily due to their lack of funds. 
To prevent less scrupulous users from selfishly emptying the entire trust 
fund, the trust should be limited to a certain number of hours or a total 
monetary amount, whichever comes first, and the rest of which would have 
 
 137. See supra notes 82–87 and accompanying text. 
 138. See supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
 139. See supra notes 93, 96–97. 
 140. See supra notes 98–100 and accompanying text. 
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to be paid by the user himself or herself.  Although it does not wholly 
account for all possible legal fees that may be incurred, some financial 
assistance is better than none. 
D. Overruling the Holdings in Rossi and Lenz 
More than the other recommendations, overruling the joint holdings in 
Rossi and Lenz is quite possibly the most important goal to achieve if users 
are ever to make successful cases for misrepresentation should the parties 
fail to come to a resolution via ODR and therefore, must pursue litigation.  
As mentioned above: 
Rossi held that a copyright holder could only have a subjective, not an 
objective, good faith belief in determining whether to issue a takedown 
notice.141  As the court stated in its opinion, a “copyright owner cannot be 
liable simply because an unknowing mistake is made, even if the copyright 
owner acted unreasonably in making the mistake.†.†. . Rather, there must be 
a demonstration of some actual knowledge of misrepresentation on the part 
of the copyright owner.”142 
Lenz held that copyright owners must make a good faith consideration 
of whether the alleged infringing content constitutes fair use prior to sending 
out a takedown notice and that this consideration was consistent with the 
DMCA’s section 512(f) misrepresentation clause.143  However, this 
consideration is somewhat limited in scope, as Rossi still holds, and thus 
section 512(f) still only requires subjective bad faith.144  Taken to its logical 
end, a user that uploaded UGC to an OSP, such as YouTube, would 
therefore only successfully bring a cause of action for misrepresentation, let 
alone win, if he or she can somehow procure and provide evidence of actual 
subjective bad faith on the copyright holder’s part.  This subjective standard 
imposes an incredibly difficult obstacle to surpass on the part of the user, 
making it very unlikely misrepresentation actions will be brought. 
Although Rossi and Lenz are mandatory authority only in the Ninth 
Circuit, they nevertheless stand out as persuasive authority to the rest of the 
federal circuit courts should they eventually address the issue.  More 
jurisdictions adopting the Ninth Circuit’s holdings would be nothing short of 
disastrous for users’ abilities to claim misrepresentation, especially when 
nothing shows that copyright holders will cease making fraudulent 
infringement claims anytime soon. 
 
 141. See supra note 65. 
 142. See supra note 68. 
 143. See supra note 65; 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A) (2010). 
 144. See supra note 66; O’Donnell, supra note 81, at 19. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Under the existing DMCA, the current dispute process for OSPs like 
YouTube is solely focused on adversarial litigation: a process which in 
practice unfortunately comes across as largely one-sided and inequitable to 
the detriment of the users of said OSPs.  This process is created in no small 
part by a chilling effect in which users are reluctant to voice their grievances 
due to a lack of monetary resources and legal experience.  Adopting an 
ODR-based approach would be more equitable in practice as it would allow 
users a chance to voice to their opinions under a process that is less 
expensive, more efficacious on average, and in a more cooperative manner.  
To support ODR, a small grace period should be implemented allowing 
users to enter into ODR with copyright holders prior to takedown, larger 
fines should be placed against copyright holders for misrepresentation, a 
nationwide trust fund should be formed to assist users in paying their legal 
dues, and the subjective standard established and reinforced in Rossi and 
Lenz should be replaced with an objective standard of misrepresentation. 
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